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A Theoretical Exploration of Consumer Engineering: Implicit Contracts and Market 
Making 
 




The growing literature exploring the emergence of modern marketing has concentrated on the 
periodization of different marketing techniques coming into usage, the retailing of different 
product categories, the internationalization of retail formats, and advertising practices.1 But 
recent research has begun to focus on deliberate attempts to elicit consumer spending on novel 
products by firms and marketing specialists. This more recent literature explores how specialists, 
in particular designers and market researchers, in the middle decades of the twentieth century 
began to move away from a product-focused approach to one that placed the consumer at the 
center of marketing initiatives. This development was also associated with the move away from 
marketing as simply a promotional activity toward strategic marketing instead. Now marketing 
management informed the entire organization of activities within the firm.2  
The near paradox of this mid-century movement was that while its adherents were intent 
on the primacy of consumer interests, consumer agency was viewed with suspicion. In 1952, the 
German-American market researcher Alfred Politz emphasized that “consumers do not know 
what they want and why they act.”3 With consumers so resistant to the active search for answers 
to their problems, specialists had to step in to diagnose and solve their problems for them.4 These 
specialist market researchers and product designers developed tools and techniques to elicit the 
explication of previously unarticulated consumer preferences. This was consumer engineering. 
The historical debates on consumer engineering, on whether or not it was beneficial to or 
exploitative of consumers, are summarized elsewhere in this volume. This chapter aims to use 
economic reasoning to explain why consumer engineering was so successful. 
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From a theoretical perspective, this description of the relationship between producers and 
consumers is one that is characterized by information asymmetries. The sellers have information 
about the product that the buyers do not possess. Producers believe they have a product that will 
solve a consumer problem, but consumers typically do not know whether the product will solve 
their problem or not. Using information economics theory and exploring the implications of 
information asymmetries, this article will explore a theoretical explanation for the rise and 
significance of consumer engineers in the mid-twentieth century, suggesting why consumer 
engineering became significant at a certain time and in certain sectors rather than others. 
The result of this theoretical exercise is the suggestion that producers of novel and 
complex consumer goods, especially of durable goods, have to engage in market-making 
innovation as well as product innovation. Market-making innovation describes a set of 
contractual (or more often quasi-contractual) agreements designed to overcome consumers’ 
reluctance to purchase a product. This reluctance to purchase is driven not by the product, but 
instead by the nature of the transaction. Transactions between consumers and producers can be 
very simple. But they can also become very complicated. One of the principal drivers of 
transactional complexity is the presence of information asymmetries. 
 
Setting out the Problem of Information Asymmetries: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in 
Effects in Consumer Markets  
The transactional relationship under consideration is between firms and consumers.5 Firms sell 
novel products to consumers. Consumers buy these novel products, about which they have little 
information, from firms. Under such conditions of uncertainty, consumer purchases are decisions 
made on the basis of crude estimates of expected future utility.6 There is a risk such estimates 
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may turn out to be wildly inaccurate. Consumers in fact only acquire sufficient information to 
make an informed judgment about the utility of a purchased novel product at some point after the 
formal completion of the contract, meaning these transactions share characteristics of 
incomplete, open-ended contracts and their associated risks. Producers may seek to disseminate 
information to overcome such risks, but consumers are unlikely to take such information at face 
value, as producers may be less than fully transparent in order to complete and profit from the 
transaction.  
This is not the case for all novel consumer goods. For many new products, consumers are 
well placed to be able to test the firm’s claims because for many products, “search goods” in 
Nelson’s terminology, consumers can sample or test goods before purchase.7 Nelson 
differentiated search goods from others, which are sufficiently complex in nature that consumers 
are unable to gain sufficient information prior to purchase, which he called “experience goods.” 
Transactions involving the latter possess similar characteristics to open-ended, incomplete 
contracts because novel experience goods are acquired in faith by consumers. Only through 
actually experiencing them after purchase is the consumer genuinely able to judge whether the 
product has met ex ante expectations. Substantial experimental evidence from behavioral 
economists conclusively shows that poorly informed consumers facing complex products 
typically prefer not to purchase the product, rather than run the risk of making an incorrect 
decision.8 Economists call this risk to transactions from the relative ignorance of one party the 
adverse selection effect.  
Nelson went on to identify a class of goods where consumers would not even be able to 
judge the utility after experiencing them: credence goods.9 For some quasi-open-ended 
transactions there is also the additional risk of moral hazard, where one party has the power to 
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exploit the other without being detected, so where sellers can exploit buyers’ gullibility. This 
leads to what Akerlof described as the “lemons” problem.10 In markets for credence goods 
characterized by information asymmetry, where the seller possesses more information than the 
buyer and where the buyer suspects that the seller may act opportunistically, the buyer will insist 
on a discount in the price to reflect the cost of insuring against their possible exploitation by the 
seller (or of the purchase turning into a “lemon,” the American slang expression for dud cars. 
Without such price cuts consumers will withdraw from the market as the risk of them losing out 
to opportunistic sellers appears too great. In some markets the reduction in price demanded by 
consumers to insure them against the risks of moral hazard may be easily absorbed or passed on 
to suppliers. But in markets characterized by very high sunk costs, producers may not be able to 
pay the consumers’ implicit insurance premium. To overcome such a strong propensity to 
consumer withdrawal, producers must invest in developing communication channels not only to 
disseminate relevant information about the product itself but also to convince consumers of their 
trustworthiness.11 The penalty of continued consumer suspicion of opportunistic producer 
behavior is lower prices, lower profits, and even market breakdown.  
The probability that an experience good will become a credence good depends on the 
extent of the threat of moral hazard. For example, there are several kinds of experience goods 
that spur repeat demand; the products are consumed typically shortly after purchase, leading to 
further repeat purchases, subject to some satisfaction threshold being met. Consumers here are 
neither able to consume at the point of purchase (like most services) nor to sample before 
purchase (like search goods), but they are able to benefit from the information about the product 
generated by their previous purchases. The risks of novelty and the dependence on the 
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producer’s promise are not eradicated, but are modified to one where producers commit to 
ensure future purchases are consistent with previous ones.  
For novel durable goods, however, consumers are more dependent on an entrepreneur’s 
promise because the transactions are not repeat purchases (and so consumers possess no 
information from previous purchases), but also because once a durable good has been purchased, 
consumers have less incentive to continue sampling and testing alternatives thereafter. Consumer 
durables like computers or automobiles might be typical of these products. Furthermore, 
consumer durables are typically more expensive and are treated as quasi-investment goods. The 
possibility of a bad purchase therefore represents a higher long-term risk to consumer utility 
because of the time required before the expense can be fully amortized and the product replaced. 
 









Table 1 summarizes this first step of setting out the problem posed by information asymmetries. 
It illustrates that many transactions for novel goods and services are unaffected by either moral 
hazard or adverse selection effects, and so face minimal risk of consumer withdrawal. For 
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example, when both adverse selection and moral hazard effects are low, in Box 1 (with novel 
search goods like clothing perhaps), consumers are sufficiently informed to pursue their own 
self-interest and fully commit to transactions. In Box 2, low product complexity means minimal 
risk of adverse selection effects, but the open-ended nature of the contract exposes consumers to 
the risk of moral hazard. Entrepreneurial entry into these types of markets (domestic construction 
services perhaps) would have to devise contractual strategies to avoid lemon-style insurance-
related discounts (through stage payments perhaps).  
In some markets for complex experience goods, Box 3, consumers face the risk of 
adverse selection (it is too complex for them to know ex ante whether the product will meet 
expectations), but consumption is sufficiently coincident with the moment of purchase to make 
the risk of moral hazard minimal. These markets might be composed of nondurable goods and 
services. In order to overcome the risk of complexity, entrepreneurs may seek to build 
incrementally on existing products and services, thus enabling consumers to draw comparisons 
either from their own or others’ previous transactions.  
For entrepreneurs engaged in markets like Box 4, where entrepreneurs are introducing 
novel, complex, non-incremental durable goods, consumers in the target market possesses little 
relevant information and have little prospect of independently accessing such information so as 
to make an informed decision. There is therefore a high risk of adverse selection effects 
influencing consumer reception. Moreover, because consumers have to pay up front, but will 
have open-ended requirements, there is a strong risk of moral hazard. Such markets, often for 
novel, high-tech durable products with high intellectual property content, for instance, are a 
common feature of the entrepreneurship literature.12 Yet focusing on the characteristics of such 
markets from the consumer’s perspective should lead to the conclusion that without appropriate 
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market-making innovations, these are markets with a high risk of consumer withdrawal and so 
high rates of entrepreneurial failure regardless of the merits of the novel product itself.  
 
Producer Response: Market-Making Innovation and Implicit Contracts 
Nelson’s focus on the different properties of consumer goods is helpful because it indicates how 
producers might respond with different advertising strategies when engaging with risk-averse 
consumers in transactions characterized by varying degrees of information asymmetries. While 
this was an advance on Akerlof (who, as Stiglitz reminds us, ignored the desire of producers to 
supply more information13), for the purposes of this article, Nelson’s typology does not go far 
enough in explaining the difficulties facing entrepreneurs in responding to such information 
asymmetries. Indeed, there is nothing in Nelson’s analysis that necessarily leads to an 
entrepreneur having to invest in a market-making response. Alternative institutional solutions 
could easily be envisaged (standards, regulations, independent arbiters, etc.) to overcome the 
problems to such transactions caused by information asymmetries.14 To understand why in most 
consumer goods markets it is producers who take on the role of reducing the risk of consumer 
withdrawal from the threats of adverse selection and moral hazard rather than any other party to 
the transaction, it is important to explain why consumers find it so difficult to specify their 
wishes in advance of purchasing a product. 
 
Overcoming Costly Pre-purchase Specification with Credible Commitments and Implicit 
Contracts for Novel Products 
Another way to conceptualize Nelson’s demarcation between credence, experience, and search 
goods is to understand that when consumers are unable to specify their requirements prior to 
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purchase, they will only be able to make an informed judgment of a product’s utility after 
experiencing it. Consumers are able to assess search goods, the look and feel of the fabric, for 
example, and so acquire sufficient information about the good’s likely utility before they 
purchase it. For credence and experience goods, by contrast, making such an assessment is 
impossible. 
It is this inability to specify requirements before a purchase that so powerfully 
demarcates consumer demand from business demand for novel complex products. Businesses 
typically have a much greater understanding of the specification required for any particular new 
product and so business-to-business markets are often characterized by tenders and other sorting 
techniques to ensure better matches between buyer and seller.15  
In the absence of clear specification from consumers, producers engage in some 
guesswork in order to better identify more exactly what it is that consumers desire but are unable 
to articulate. Producers may invest in market and consumer research to acquire partial support 
for their decisions. But no market research can provide perfect information, and so, in the end, 
producers have to opt for a particular product or design with less than perfect information about 
consumer desires.16 An entrepreneur making investment decisions in the face of just such an 
absence of consumer specifications is what Casson describes as exercising entrepreneurial 
judgment.17 It is this adoption of specific techniques by producers (often using specialist 
assistance) to better understand unarticulated consumer desires that historians have discussed as 
consumer engineering.  
Having made their decision, producers have to communicate with their target audience 
about their particular novel product. But given that the real underlying consumer demand factors 
remain unarticulated, producers engage in communicating with consumers through tacit 
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information like branding, logos, and other forms of product and corporate imagery, using 
vehicles such as advertising, sponsorship, public relations, and so on. Producers invest in such 
intangible information with the aim of leading consumers to recognize congruence between their 
unarticulated desires and what the firms are offering. 
Producers of complex consumer goods therefore have to communicate with prospective 
consumers in order to convince them that the particular complex product is the solution to 
consumers’ problem. But they have to do so in such a way that overcomes any reluctance to deal 
with complexity (adverse selection) and mistrust (moral hazard). This is market making. What 
makes it particularly difficult is that consumers are so unwilling to prespecify their requirements, 
that producers have to communicate solutions to consumers without articulating what are, in 
effect, quasi-contractual commitments.  
The need for innovation in market making is therefore the outcome not of information 
asymmetries per se, but rather of the evidently very high costs to consumers of articulating more 
clearly their required specification pre-purchase. If producers found market-making more costly, 
then consumers would have a stronger incentive to specify their own requirements and then 
invest in a search for the most suitable providers. Such a market, like most business-to-business 
markets, would involve much reduced marketing costs, but much greater specification and search 
costs. Given the expense of market-making innovations like brands and reputations, it is 
reasonable to infer that consumers find it very costly to engage in any rigorous specification 
process. It is not so much that consumers “do not know what they want” (Politz) but that they 
discover that it is too expensive for them to find out.  
Producers therefore have to provide sufficient relevant information to consumers more 
cheaply than consumers can discover it themselves.18 Moreover, it is firms that typically have the 
10  
stronger incentive to resolve the risk of consumer withdrawal rather than consumers because 
firms’ investments in sunk costs associated with production are significantly greater than any 
individual consumer’s search costs. It is producers, therefore, that will invest in consumer 
engineering and other market-making strategies in order to make the markets for complex 
consumer goods work to all parties’ satisfaction. When consumers typically do invest in pre-
purchase specification (for example, in self-designed house construction), there is much less 
incentive for producers to invest in brand creation (house builders, to continue the example, 
merely tender bids on price and quality).  
In some consumer goods sectors, then, typically complex durable goods, where repeat 
purchases are rare, amortization costs are high, and consumers find pre-purchase specification 
very costly, producers face the strongest incentive to provide intangible product-specific 
information to consumers. Firms see real economic benefit to investing in consumer engineering 
and other market-making innovations. If consumers believe the intangible information offered by 
producers, the risks and hence the costs to contracting are reduced, and so consumers will 
transact and they too will enjoy the economic benefits of the transaction.  
Such market-making solutions involve by definition the ability to meet a consumer’s 
unarticulated, open-ended requirements and so require a firm to go beyond the explicit contract 
of exchange—transferring the rights to a good for a given price—to an implicit contract, where 
the producer communicates to the consumer that it will meet all their product-associated 
demands, whether understood at the moment of transaction or not, whether codified or not, and 
until some point in the future when consumer uncertainty falls away approximately to zero. Such 
a commitment to unspecified consumer requirements therefore represents unfunded guarantees to 
future expectations. Implicit contracts are costly but necessary market-making innovations. 
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Okun defined implicit contracts as “invisible handshakes” or “arrangements that are not 
legally binding but that give both sides incentives to maintain the relationship.”19 Substantial 
anecdotal or partial evidence of the pervasiveness of implicit contracts can be drawn from a 
variety of contexts in which relationship is preferred to contract. Examples occur in the business 
history literature on complex infrastructure projects,20 in the international management literature 
on German and Japanese corporate governance systems,21 and in the cross-cultural management 
literature on Chinese managers’ decision-making,22 to list but a few. 
The economic literature on implicit contracts makes clear, however, that markets so 
characterized are only able to function in the presence of supportive social norms. The most 
significant norm to be observed in experimental data is reciprocity.23 Reciprocity’s importance in 
the behavioral economics literature derives from its ability to enable markets characterized by 
implicit contracts to function. It overcomes what Avner Greif has called “the fundamental 
problem of exchange.”24 But this observation implies that a transactional relationship between 
entrepreneurs and consumers based on implicit contracts exhibits more similarities with a 
“prisoner’s dilemma” view of the world than does the conventional understanding of price-taking 
free markets. Credible and long-term commitments to repeated exchange introduce significant 
constraints on both parties’ freedom of action, with consumer engineering characterized by 
producer promises to consumers. When this marketing strategy succeeds, it is because consumers 
are able to judge from the evidence of the transaction that the producer has kept the promise. The 
principle of reciprocity then leads consumers to keep on purchasing and producer reputation is 
enhanced. On the other hand, should consumers detect from the evidence of consuming that 
producers are reneging, trust will break and the transactional relationship will fail. 
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Implicit contracts have been particularly influential in the economics of the labor market, 
where the empirical observation of lower-than-expected levels of volatility in employment and 
wages over the course of a business cycle has been explained by “the hypothesis that contract 
wages embody implicit payments of insurance premiums by workers in favourable states of 
nature and receipts of indemnities in unfavourable states.”25 The equivalent of this wage rigidity 
in labor markets is price rigidity in consumer markets. The literature here emphasizes that risk-
averse consumers interpret any change in price or quality that appears to favor producer interests 
as producer opportunism, and so producers face a strong incentive to maintain price and quality 
to avoid consumer boycotts.26 Once “the firm draws a clientele with attractive implicit contracts, 
any deviation unfavourable to consumers is seen as a violation of these contracts.”27 The 
strongest empirical support for this is provided by Young and Levy’s excellent analysis of Coca 
Cola’s seventy years’ persistence with price rigidity, where the real price of Coca Cola was held 
almost constant for over seventy years. There is also Godley’s interpretation of Singer’s 
enormous investment in its international sales organization. Neither the cheapest nor 
technologically the best sewing machine, Singer was nevertheless able to enjoy a dominant 
global market position for several decades.28  
To sum up, the first difficulty facing producers of novel complex durables is 
communicating to inarticulate consumers that such goods might meet their needs. Because most 
complex durables possess strong elements of basic multifunctionality, it is difficult for producers 
to signal likely post-purchase usage to potential consumers through conventional promotion 
strategies. Product complexity and consumer inability to pre-specify requirements suggest that an 
appropriate market-making solution to overcome the risk of adverse selection would be for an 
entrepreneur to invest in signaling mechanisms to disseminate information that allows consumers 
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to judge how they might use the product. Historians research on consumer engineering could 
here focus on the nature of signaling mechanisms adopted by such producers.  
The second difficulty relates to the open-ended nature of transactions. The explicit 
contract is a spot transaction (or a near-spot transaction in cases of installment purchases). But 
consumers will be aware of the risk of moral hazard, as producers simply may not keep 
promises. For novel durable goods, producers may initially offer attractive servicing and repair 
terms but subsequently change terms, for example. Entrepreneurs seeking to overcome consumer 
propensity to withdraw because of the risk of moral hazard would therefore need to make 
credible commitments not to change service conditions in ways that might adversely affect 
consumers. But because consumers’ future requirements remain unspecified at the point of 
transaction, such a commitment must be made through an implicit contract.  
It follows that if implicit contracts are the preferred solution to overcoming the threat of 
consumer withdrawal in markets for complex consumer goods, entrepreneurs will need to invest 
in market-making innovations that reduce the risks to consumers of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Historians of marketing might here want to explore the relationship between product 
design and contractual design to better explain the significance of the nature of the contractual 
transaction as a market-making innovation. 
The most complete market-making response would be a comprehensive presales 
demonstration and after-sales service that met all information requirements for consumers of 
novel durables, much as has been described for Singer.29 Such an investment would be hugely 
costly for entrepreneurs, but it would signal a credible, market-making commitment to elicit 
consumer trust at the market’s point of entry. This scenario would represent the ultimate and 
most expensive example of consumer engineering. 
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Given the expense associated with such a market-making innovation, entrepreneurs might 
simply pass on the costs of after-sales services to consumers in the form of an explicit list of 
prices for a variety of services.30 But charging the market rate for after-sales services opens up 
the possibility of third parties establishing themselves as competing sources of such services. In 
the long run, competition in the provision of aftersales service is unlikely to impact firm strategy, 
but at the point of market entry where the need to elicit trust with consumers is the key to 
successful market-making, competition in after sales service may undermine the credible 
commitments needed for the relationship between entrepreneur and consumer to begin. Thus, 
producers will prefer to subsidize their after-sales services and so deter competitor entry. 
Because the cost of such a subsidy has to come from product revenues, premium pricing 
strategies have to be employed by producers. Otherwise the subsidy for market-support services 
is not viable. The provision below-cost of after-sales support and advice to consumers of 
complex durables should therefore overcome much of the risk of potential consumer 
withdrawal.31 The implication is that historians of consumer engineering need also to take full 
account of producers’ pricing strategies as another element of the relationship with consumers 
unable or unwilling to articulate their desires. 
 
Conclusion 
This discussion of the theory of implicit contracts and market-making takes as its point of 
departure theoretical insights drawn from information economics about the consequences for 
information asymmetries in market relationships and the high probability for these to lead to 
market failure of some sort. The chapter then suggests that adapting game theory insights from 
“prisoners’ dilemma”–type scenarios suggests that the solution to such complex transactions lies 
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in producers cultivating consumers’ trust in their ability to solve consumers’ problems. This 
insight can readily be applied to the rapid growth of consumer engineering during the middle 
decades of the twentieth century. This was the period of the consumer revolution, and the 
introduction of many novel, but complex consumer goods. But because consumers did not 
articulate their desires or pre-specify their requirements, it fell to producers to communicate the 
benefits of these novel products and why they would solve consumer problems. The criticism 
from consumer engineers of the time was that consumers “do not know what they want” (Politz). 
But the conclusion of this theoretical introduction would be that a better interpretation of 
consumer behavior was that consumers discovered that it was too costly for them to decide what 
they wanted.  
 Marketing materials shifted during the early decades of the twentieth century from being 
dominated by explicit product information to growing use of imagery and other forms of tacit 
information. As the twentieth century progressed, so producers increasingly moved to place 
consumers at the center of their marketing initiatives. Indeed, as the concept of strategic 
marketing emerged, so consumer requirements, rather than engineering constraints, became 
increasingly central to product design. Consumer engineers like Politz therefore had to develop 
tools and techniques to both identify consumer desires and then persuade firms to adapt their 
offerings in order to make these markets function optimally. 
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